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The charterers alleged that the owners had failed to perform the contract and claimed damages of US$6,773,000. The said contract provided for any disputes between the parties to be referred to arbitration in London. Accordingly, charterers appointed [X] as an arbitrator and called upon the owners to respond by appointing an arbitrator within 14 days. However, the owners failed to do so, and the charterers appointed [X] that accepted the appointment to act as a sole arbitrator. The charterers served their Claim Submissions. However, the owners failed to serve their defence within 28 days. Therefore, the tribunal made an order for the owners to serve their defence or failing to do so, “a final and peremptory order will likely follow with a short time limit coupled with a draconian sanction, as contemplated by section 41/7 of the Arbitration Act 1996.” The owners failed to serve their defence and on behalf of the owners, [ YYY as will be referred to this post being redacted ]: “Please be advised that I will mount a comprehensive and vigorous defence of my position in relation to the claim made in your e-mail of 23/9. As I have being unwell for some time, due to my family being kidnapped, may I request an extension to the period wherein I should serve details of my defence. May I also seek your assistance in requesting your client to desist from any further abusive phone calls, e-mails addressed to my colleagues and me.” The charterers responded: “Further to the exchange below, I have received no Defence or any request for an extension (or indeed any communication from the Respondents at all). Our clients have taken the precaution of serving the Arbitration Notice plus Claim Submissions and copies of interlocutory Orders/exchanges to the Respondents Protections and Indemnity Club under their liability insurance in London. In fact, service was carried out by the Court. As a result, there can be no question whatsoever that the respondents have been made aware of the claims and your involvement. May our clients now have the final and peremptory Order foreshadowed in your e-mail of 23/9/2013. Many thanks in advance.” The owners did not respond and the tribunal made an order, in final and peremptory terms, the owners to serve their defence by 18th October, or the tribunal will proceed to an award on the materials placed before it, per section 41/7 of Arbitration Act 1996. On 18th October, [YYY] on behalf of the the owners requested more time to respond as “I had been led to believe that a response had been made in my absence. Unfortunately I have not been shown the papers that were delivered, I believe, to the office in [X]. Nor have I the contact details for the lawyers in [X]. Regrettably I have been hospitalised for some time due to a horrible kidnapping of my wife and child.. .. May I respectfully seek a modest extension of one week, because given the gravity of the situation, and the fact that there is a solid defence, and that I have just emerged from hospital: I need a little time to assemble our defence papers for submission to your esteemed office.” On 19th October, [YYY] sent another e-mail, “I have been in … hospital Psychiatric Facility …I do not have the reports to hand; but the hospital assure that they will forward them to you forthwith….” On 21st October, the charterers wrote to the tribunal: “”I need to check progress with you. As you will see from the e-mail chain below, a final and peremptory order was made with an expiry of 18th October. The Respondents did ask for an extension of a week although nothing was ever served. Can you please confirm that submissions are closed and that you are proceeding to your award. The sums involved are very significant and as a result, my clients are anxious to hear from you.” On the same day, the tribunal responded, “The proceedings are indeed closed. I shall proceed to my award as soon as I can.” That prompted another message from [YYY]: “I was shocked to receive your e- mail of the 13rd inst. I was of the opinion that this matter had been dealt with some time ago. Unfortunately I have been in hospital frequently over the last month, and indeed remain under treatment. The illness is regrettably of a psychiatric nature which was directly caused by the torture and kidnaping of my wife and child whom both were rapped and battered. I have never received papers from your lawyer in london nor indeed do I know his name. I apologise for the lateness of my reply, but I respectfully seek the opportunity to place our evidence, which we believe to be robust, and complete, in front of the relevant authority. The evidence will be at your disposal forthwith. However, if found necessary, we will vigorously contest the award, as it has been given without evidence on our part. I also wish to voice my concern about the torrent of abuse that has heaped on my colleagues, and me, since August of this year, It has been malicious, threatening, intimidating and gratuitously insulting. The lawyers believe it is more serious than that. Yours Sincerely YYY[REDACTED] ” And on 8th November, [YYY] sent another e-mail repeating more or less the reasons argued previously for the delay in responding and asked for some more time. Two weeks passed, and the tribunal heard nothing from him or his “colleagues”. Therefore, the tribunal determined that it should proceed to an award as the matter had dragged on long enough. The tribunal held that the charterer’ claim succeeded in the settlement amount agreed to by the charterer and the owners Protection and Indemnity Club liability insurance in the sum of US$2,965,033 Award accordingly. Final Award, 11th November 2013 Note: For more information, please check on Jus Mundi https://jusmundi.com/en/ . These awards mostly come into the public domain through enforcement under the NYC 1958 .

The Merchant did not provide cargo to be loaded at Houston in repudiatory breach of the booking note, and the Carrier claimed dead freight of US $100,275.00. As provided by Clause 11. (h) of the booking note, the amount invoiced represented the gross freight of US $140,275.00 less estimated port and stevedore costs saved of US $15,000.00 and US$25,000.00, respectively. As the invoice remained unpaid, the Carrier proceeded to arbitration. The Carrier appointed [X] as an arbitrator, advised the Merchant in writing of his appointment, and called upon the Merchant to appoint an arbitrator within 14 days. However, the Merchant did not appoint an arbitrator and having regard to Sections 16(5(a), 17(1), 17(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996, [X] agreed to act as a sole arbitrator in this reference. The Carrier served his claim submissions on 9 February, claiming dead freight US$ 100,275.00, interest, and costs. On 13 February, the tribunal sent a message to the Merchant containing an order to serve his Defence submissions within 28 days as per LMAA Terms. On the same day, the Merchant’s legal representative responded to this message that there was no contract between the Carrier and the Merchant because the Merchant had not signed the booking note. Therefore, the tribunal had no jurisdiction in this matter. The tribunal replied, ‘ While I cannot comment on the merits of either party’s case in this arbitration reference, I should point out that there is no requirement under English law that a contract must be signed in order to be valid and binding. My order for your clients to serve their Defence submissions in the arbitration stands. Should they not do so, they run the risk of a default Award being made against them’. Again, the Merchant’s legal representatives repeated their position to which the tribunal responded, ‘ I shall be making no further comment on the points that you raise and await service of your clients’ Defence.’ The Merchants did not serve any Defence, and the tribunal made a final and peremptory order that Defence submissions be served by 5:30 pm London time on 23 March. Was there a binding contract between the parties? The tribunal was aware that the Merchant had maintained that there was no binding contract between it and the Carrier. While this was not pleaded as no Defence was served, the existence or not of a contract was in any event a matter on which the tribunal would have to satisfy itself, as, notwithstanding there having been no defence submissions, the claimant Carrier was nonetheless required to prove its case. The tribunal considered the events leading to this arbitration and the email exchanges between the Merchant and the Carrier concerning the carriage of this cargo. First, the Merchant requested a freight quotation that the Carrier provided. Further exchanges ensued with details about the Vessel that would carry this cargo and arrival dates at the port, including an itinerary and a booking confirmation. Later, the Carrier sent an itinerary to the Merchant, who replied, informing the Carrier that it could not provide the cargo for shipment on the agreed dates. The message of 26 December read as follows: We will not make this cut off. Can you confirm when your next Vessel will be loading? We will not be able to get this cargo In houston until approx.. January 09th-12th. ALSO I may have to increase the booking to 1533 cubic meters Held, On the evidence, there was a binding booking note contract. The Merchant’s message was a clear and unequivocal acceptance of the Carrier’s unqualified proposal of the Vessel. The governing law of that contract was English law, under which a contract does not have to be signed in order to be valid and binding; it is sufficient that the acceptance is communicated to the party making the offer, which is what occurred in the present case. There was no evidence presented that the Merchant had in any way sought to contradict the confirmation; had the Merchant considered that no contract had been formed, the tribunal would have expected to see a copy of a message sent by return disputing his confirmation. The Merchant’s message of 26 December evinced an intention not to be bound by the booking note and was thus in repudiatory breach of the contract, which repudiation the Carrier had accepted. Consequently, the Carrier was entitled to dead freight as claimed. Based on the tribunal’s experience, the amounts deducted for port and stevedore costs were realistic and therefore concluded that the Carrier was entitled to be awarded the amount claimed. Award accordingly. Final Award, 26 March 2015 Note: For more information, please check on Jus Mundi https://jusmundi.com/en/ . These awards mostly come into the public domain through enforcement under the NYC 1958 .

In this arbitration, under the LMAA Terms, various disputes arose under an amended SHELLTIME 4 CP. The Owners submitted that the Charterers had specifically, wrongly and in breach of the Charter Party failed: a) to pay hire as and when due following the 4th hire instalment in breach of Clause 8, and b) to provide and pay for bunkers resulting in the Owners having to bunker the vessel in Santos at a cost to the Owners of US$143,498.36 in breach of Clause 7(a); and c) to pay for disbursements at Rosario resulting in the Owners being required to pay US$61,370.00 to obtain the vessel’s release from arrest at New Orleans in breach of Clause 7(a). [Author’s Comment: The charterers did not participate in arbitration despite being given every opportunity to do so. Therefore,  a Tribunal will proceed to its Award on the Claimant’s Submissions and Documents alone (providing a case has been made out) if the Respondents refuse or fail to participate in the arbitration procedure. However, the arbitrator has a duty to carefully consider the documents and calculations accompanying the Claimant’s Submissions before issuing any Award.] Payment of hire Owners submitted that the Charterers failed to pay hire as and when due and therefore exercised their right of lien over sub-freights to obtain payments direct from sub-charters. These totalled US$1,466,319.75, and credits for the various amounts were shown in the Hire Statement. The owners adduced copies of all supporting documentation. The tribunal was satisfied that the Charterers had persistently failed to pay hire as and when it became due; therefore, the Charterers were clearly in breach of Clause 8 of the Charter Party due to these failures. Payment of bunkers Clause 7(a) of the Charter Party provided for the Charterers to pay for bunkers, which was the usual practice under a time charter such as this. However, the Owners submitted that, whilst in Santos, the Charterers failed to stem and pay for bunkers advising the Owners that they had financial problems preventing payment from being made. The tribunal held that such actions again clearly placed the Charterers in breach of Clause 7(a), and the Owners were entitled to reimbursement of the full amount being claimed for bunkers at Santos. Payment for release of vessel from arrest In compliance with the Charterers’ orders, the vessel called at Dock Sud and Rosario, incurring disbursements at each port. The Owners contended that the Charterers did not pay the agents. Subsequently, on 15 July, the agents demanded US$59,869.00, advising that if they did not receive payment by 17 July, they would take legal action, which may include the vessel’s arrest. The Owners contended that the Charterers made no payment to the various demands. Accordingly, the vessel was arrested in New Orleans on behalf of the agents pursuing their claim, which was by then US$60,574.16. From that moment, additional fees of US$30.00 per hour were incurred in respect of the fees of the Appointment of Custodian. In the event that the vessel was released at 1309 on 24 July, the owners had paid the sum of US$61,370.00, and they adduced full supporting documentation. The tribunal held that Clause 7(a) provides for the Charterers to settle the agents’ account for various items which were always for the account of the Charterers under a time charter, and it was no different in this case. The fees had been incurred, and the Charterers had failed to pay the amount called for, which resulted in the vessel being arrested in New Orleans. The tribunal held that the Charterers’ failure to settle the agents’ account at Dock Sud and Rosario was a clear breach of Clause 7(a), which directly resulted in the vessel being arrested. Consequently, the Owners must be entitled to repayment of the sum of US$61,370.00, which amount was caused as a direct result of the Charterers’ failure to pay the agents for the disbursement account following the vessel’s call at those ports. Consequently, the owners’ application for an Interim Award of US$1,631,833.82 succeeded, and costs followed the event in the usual way. Note: This website removes the names of the parties involved in this or other awards. The reader can find more details on Jus Mundi https://jusmundi.com/en/ . These awards mostly come into the public domain through enforcement under the NYC 1958 . #BunkerCosts #Offhire

In this arbitration, the dispute turned on a narrow issue: whether laytime ran during some periods of fog when the vessel was waiting at the roads in Constantza, and the port was reported as closed. This, in turn, determined when demurrage began as claimed by the owners and denied by the charterers. Consequently, the parties referred their dispute to a sole arbitrator in London, and both parties were legally represented. The parties disagreed on the situation at the port during some periods. Owners said that other ships loaded their cargo during these periods. Charterers disagreed on the said cargo operations’ relevance, including the charter party’s terms on this issue. Therefore, the main points of difference were related to the meaning and effect of “weather working days”- whether the ship would be able to load had she been at berth during the relevant disputed periods, and the effect of the words “ laytime shall be interrupted during periods of adverse weather” as found in a separately printed clause. For the latter, charterers argued that it provided an answer to the dispute, as these words widened the scope of “ weather working day”. Next, the parties disagreed on whether the ship could load had she been at berth, how she would load her cargo and for how long. The owners relied on official records of the Constantza port authority, showing that other vessels were loading during said periods. Charterers disputed the data and provided evidence from the Naval Authority to support that the port had suspended navigation during the disputed periods under fog. For the latter, owners asserted it dealt with navigation, not cargo operations. On the evidence, there was no doubt that fog and poor visibility prevailed at the port during the disputed periods. This was reported by the master in the SOF, including the statement from the Naval authorities as signed by the harbourmaster and the navigation department. In addition, the charterers’ agent’s email to the parties referred to cargo operations being suspended. One of the other vessels stopped loading and waited for weather improvement, which the changes in the declared departure time (ETD) proved. Also, barges were likely not allowed to manoeuvre around the vessel under fog and poor visibility and carry out cargo operations. In essence, the evidence was not satisfactory to calculate the exact periods that the vessel could load during these disputed periods. Thus, the tribunal could not award the full demurrage claimed by the owners under the “weather working days” regime. Then, the tribunal considered the effect of the separate clause referred to “adverse weather”. The charterers argued that since there was “adverse weather”, it did not matter if cargo operations were carried out. Adverse weather certainly includes weather that affects navigation in the port. The owners said the clause did not apply as fog did not affect navigation inside the port because other ships proceeded to the berth. So the burden was on the charterers to show an exception to laytime, and they failed to do so. The tribunal was satisfied that prima facie, the certificate from the Naval authority established that the fog suspended the movement of vessels in and out of port. Regarding the interpretation of the “adverse weather”, the tribunal stated that neither party referred to any precedents and assumed there were no precedents or reported arbitration decisions. The charterers referred to an earlier version of the contract to interpret the new version. However, the tribunal did not find it decisive or permissible to look at an earlier version of a contract to interpret the current one and felt bound to treat the recent clause on its wording. Also, the tribunal said that bad weather is not enough to trigger the clause as the charterers had argued. If adverse meant bad, it would be difficult to draw a line between bad and good weather. ”Adverse” imports a relative concept: the test was whether the weather stopped vessels proceeding to their berths after a valid NOR was tendered. Thus, the tribunal had to consider if other ships could move to the berth at the relevant times. Of importance, the owners submitted no clear evidence of when the other ships left their anchorages and went alongside at their berths, despite that the tribunal asked the parties to make further submissions on this point. The data only showed when the vessels were alongside. Without any other evidence, the tribunal found it likely that the vessels proceeded to their berths during periods when there was no suspension of the movement. According to its findings, there was evidence that the other vessel’s movements (as referred to by the owners) were suspended and no evidence of such movements during those periods. Since “adverse weather” interrupts laytime running during the claim periods, the owners’ claim failed. Award accordingly. Comment: In London Arbitration 10/02, the tribunal decided a similar issue in the owners’ favour as the evidence indicated that fog did not interrupt the loading operations. However, this case is different: due to the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence and the applicable terms (the “adverse weather”). In some other settled cases, the agent put a clear remark in the SOF to avoid ambiguity ” Navigation was suspended, but the operation continued at berth, or the operation was not continued at berth (if that is the case)”. Note: this website removes the names of the parties, the tribunal and their representatives. No other information can be provided for this award. #BadWeather #Laytime #SOF

The vessel was chartered on an amended GENCON 1994 form to carry coal from Norfolk, USA to Gdansk or Swinoujscie, Poland. Disputes arose between the Claimant and the First and Second Respondents in respect of delays at the loadport and failure to load a cargo. Consequently, the disputes came before two LMAA Arbitrators that applied to this reference the LMAA Terms 2017. The parties were represented by solicitors. The second respondents raised a jurisdictional challenge but since the first respondent withdrew its claim against the second Respondents, the tribunal did not consider the parties’ position on their Jurisdiction over the Second Respondent. Factual background The Vessel was fixed on 4 November 2021 with a laycan of 5-15 December. After that, the parties agreed to the Vessel [X] with a laycan 30 December -6 January, making it clear that the ship should be in port by the 7th. The Vessel tendered NOR at 2035 LT on 3 January on arrival at Cape Henry sea pilot station, picked up a pilot there and subsequently anchored at Cape Charles anchorage, where NOR was re-tendered at 2240 the same day. The SOF recorded that the Vessel remained at Cape Charles anchorage from 3 January, “awaiting cargo availability and terminal berthing instructions”. It was common ground that the cargo was not in the port or available to load on the Vessel’s arrival, despite the previously anticipated urgency by the First Respondent for the Vessel to arrive without delay. Instead, the cargo was at a third-party location, where it needed to be loaded onto trains to be brought to the port for loading. Despite assurances received through various channels, the cargo never arrived at the port. In the meantime, because of the length of time the Vessel had remained idle at port, the USCG notified the Claimant on 29 January that the Vessel must leave port by 12 February. On 11 February , the First Respondent sent a message to the Claimant (“the Cancellation Message”), which stated, “we officially release[s] you today from the charter vessel of our cargo”.  Then, the Vessel departed the load port without loading the intended coal or any other cargo. The Vessel was subsequently fixed for the carriage of another coal cargo from Norfolk, USA, to Rotterdam, Netherlands, with a laycan of 9-18 March. Meantime, on 5 March, the Claimant accepted the Cancellation Message as a wrongful repudiation of the Charter. The claimant’s claims Given the alleged repudiation of the Charter, the Claimant claimed (i) demurrage for the time lost between the date of the Vessel’s arrival under the Charterparty on 3 January until its alleged termination of the Charter on 5 March , alternatively until the date of the Vessel’s delivery into the Substitute Fixture on 9 March , (ii) damages for wrongful termination and (iii) recovery of related expenses. Issues to be Determined (i) What was the legal effect of the Cancellation Message? (ii) When did the Charter come to an end? (iii) Is the Claimant entitled to demurrage ? If yes, over what period and in what amount? (iv)What was the legal effect of the demurrage invoices issued and the nature of the demurrage payments made to the Claimant? (v)Is the Claimant entitled to damages for wrongful termination? If yes, how are damages to be calculated and to what amount is the Claimant entitled? (vi)Is the Claimant entitled to recover its related expenses incurred at the loadport? For this post, the questions (i), (ii),(iv),(v), and (vi) are answered shortly. Point (iii) is mainly considered. Held, (i) What was the legal effect of the Cancellation Message? The First Respondent’s message evinced an intention not to perform its obligations under the Charterparty terms, in repudiatory breach, entitling the Claimant to accept that breach and terminate the Charter. (ii) When did the Charter come to an end? The Charter was terminated at 0723 on 5 March, when the claimant accepted the Cancellation Message as a repudiatory breach of charter and brought the Charter to an end. (iii) Is the Claimant entitled to demurrage? If yes, over what period and in what amount? It was the claimant’s case that, the Vessel having tendered NOR at 2035 on 3 January , laytime commenced at 0835 the following day and that, taking into account the allowed laytime of 2.4 days, the Vessel came on demurrage at 1811 on 6 January . Terminating the Charter at 0723 on 5 March resulted in a total period of demurrage of 57.55 days which the Claimant claimed in the total amount of USD 920,800. Alternatively, the Claimant claimed demurrage from tendering NOR on 3 January until delivery of the Vessel into the Substitute Charter on 9 March , which it calculated resulted in damages of USD 1,026,288.80. After allowance was made for the received payments of USD 199,980, the Claimant’s total claim for demurrage for USD 720,820, alternatively, damages of USD 826,308.80. The Respondent denied that the Claimant terminated the charterparty on 5 March or that it was liable for demurrage beyond 11 February. Determination Clause 31 of the Rider set out the provisions agreed in relation to tender of NOR, commencement and allowed laytime as follows : “. .. Vessel to be loaded at the rate of 20,000 Metric Tons per weather working day of 24 consecutive hours, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included, Charterers option to load at 25,000 Metric Tons….. Laytime shall commence 12 hours after the vessel tenders notice…..If the berth is not available on the Vessel’s arrival, the Master may tender said notice from a lay berth or anchorage within the port limits.” The load port SOF recorded that the Vessel first tendered NOR at 2035 on 3 January. However, the SOF also recorded that the Vessel only stopped to pick up a pilot and ended it sea passage at this point, weighing anchor shortly afterwards at 2240, at which point NOR was re-tendered. It is trite law that tender of NOR at the end of sea passage, before a vessel anchors or berths, is premature and invalid. Accordingly, the NOR tendered at 2035 on 3 January was invalid and that the first validly tendered NOR at the load port was that tendered at 2240 the same day. After allowance of the contractually agreed 12 hours turn time, the laytime at the load port started to run at 1040 on 4 January and, in the absence of any applicable interruptions or exceptions to laytime, time ran continuously thereafter as laytime and then demurrage for the First Respondent’s account. In circumstances where the reduced cargo quantity of 60,000mt arose from the First Respondent’s instructions, this should be the cargo quantity on which allowed laytime is calculated. As to the contractual load rate on which allowed laytime should be calculated, in circumstances where the First Respondent did not elect to load at the faster rate of 25,000mt pwwd, the allowed laytime at the loadport should be calculated on the basis of the load rate of 20,000mt pwwd. On the cargo quantity of 60,000mt, this equates to allowed laytime of 3 days. Allowed laytime therefore expired at 1040 on 7 January, at which point time on demurrage began to run. As to when time on demurrage stopped running, on the evidence, the Vessel left the loadport on the instructions of the USCG and returned on 9 March to enter into the Substitute Charter. Since the Charter had been terminated on 5 March , the demurrage continued to accrue until 0723 on 5 March . The Respondent is liable for demurrage for 54.86 days (57.86 days laytime minus 3 days allowed laytime). At the rate of USD 16,000 PDPR agreed on nomination, this equates to loadport demurrage of USD 877,760. (iv) What was the legal effect of the demurrage invoices issued and the nature of the demurrage payments made to the Claimant? The tribunal rejected the Respondent’s arguments for “negotiated demurrage” (due to lack of evidence) and waiver. Concerning the nature of the demurrage invoices issued, from their face, they constituted interim invoices in respect of demurrage falling due day by day. In circumstances where there was no discharge or final freight invoice issued, paragraph 13 of the Recap and Clause 35 of the Rider meant that demurrage became payable within 30 days of the termination of the Charter, provided that supporting documents had been provided. (v) Is the Claimant entitled to damages for wrongful termination? If yes, how are damages to be calculated and to what amount is the Claimant entitled? As to how the quantum of its damages claim should be calculated, relying on The Concordia C [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 55, The Noel Bay [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 361 Odfifell Seachem v Continentale Des Petroles [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 275, and Louis Dreyfus Commodities v MT Maritime Management [2015] 2 CLC 508, the Claimant calculated its entitlement to damages for wrongful termination on the basis of the difference between the net earnings it expected to achieve under the Charterparty, less those achieved under the Substitute Charter for the period the two overlapped. The tribunal considered the authorities and accepted the basis in which damages were to be calculated in principle, namely by assuming the breached fixture would have been performed immediately upon termination of the Charterparty, entitling the innocent party to recovery of its expected net earnings under the terminated charter, less any net earnings achieved under a substitute charter for any period of overlap, comparative calculations being achieved by the net earnings under each fixture being converted into TCE daily rates. There was no suggestion that the Vessel was employed between 11 February and 9 March. So the overlap was related to the period 5 March up to 24 March, being the expected termination date of the initial voyage. (vi) Is the Claimant entitled to recover its related expenses incurred at the loadport? The claimant claimed reimbursement of wasted port disbursement account costs and underwater cleaning costs incurred due to the extended waiting period. For the underwater cleaning costs, the claimant submitted two invoices. Since no freight ultimately fell due as a result of the First Respondent’s breach of Charter, the Claimant was out of pocket in relation to the port DA incurred as a result of the First Respondent’s breach of Charter. Therefore, the claimant was entitled to recover as damages these costs. There was no contractual provision for the allocation of risk of hull fouling as between the Parties. Rather, the Charter contained demurrage provisions to compensate the Claimant for delay at port by means of liquidated damages. Therefore, the Claimant’s claim for related expenses arising out of delay should be limited to demurrage. The second invoiced hull cleaning costs related to delay under substitute charter and that was unrelated to the First Respondent’s breach. Award in the claimant’s favour of USD 1,062,295.93, with an interest of 5% compounded at three monthly intervals and costs, following the usual rule that costs follow the event. Final Award issued 20 Sept. 2022 Note: This website removes the names of the parties involved in this or other awards. The reader can find more details on Jus Mundi https://jusmundi.com/en/ . These awards mostly come into the public domain through enforcement under the NYC 1958 .

The vessel was chartered on an amended NORGRAIN Form to carry soya beans in bulk from Paranagua to Rizhao. Disputes arose between the parties and were referred for determination to a sole arbitrator under the LMAA Terms. Owners served their Claim Submissions that included an email from the Charterers confirming the Owners’ laytime calculations. However, Charterers had not served their Defence Submissions within 28 days or requested any extension of time. Therefore, on 10 October, following the Owners’ request for an order to serve their Defence, the arbitrator asked the Charterers to respond within two days, explaining why they had not served their Defence and how soon they could do so. On the same day, the Charterers asked for an extension of seven days to serve their Defence. Meantime, the Charterers admitted the Owners’ claimed amount and said that this delay was due to “great losses in crops, economic recession, so businesses meant to be very difficult”. Also, the Charterers said that they did not see the non-payment of the balance as a dispute so the parties to resolve it in Arbitration, and this matter could be resolved amicably and proposed payment of this balance in “3 equal parcels” or earlier via freight rate adjustment if the parties fixed another voyage. Subsequently, on 7th November, the Charterers served their Defence and acknowledged the balance due to the Owners. They said they never refused to pay and repeated their offer for payment in “3 equal parcels”. This prompted a response from the Owners’ London solicitors on 11th November, requesting that the arbitrator proceeds to an award given the admission of the sums claimed. On 3Oth November, the arbitrator confirmed his intention to proceed to an award. On 16th December, the Owners’ solicitors advised the arbitrator that the Owners received a payment on account from the Charterers and requested the arbitrator not proceed to an award pending receipt of the balance as promised by February. On 15th March, the Owners’ solicitors requested the arbitrator to proceed to an award, and the arbitrator asked for clarifications from the Owners regarding the applicable interest for the paid sum (on account) and their costs. Then, the arbitrator asked the Charterers to make any comments on the sums now claimed by the Owners. The arbitrator held that the Charterers were very open in admitting the sum claimed as being due. They wished, though, to find a way of paying this by installments was not an answer to the Owners’ claim. The payment of USD 200,000 obviously reduced the balance due but left an undisputed amount of USD 99,847.34 outstanding. Consequently, the Owners were entitled to an Award for that sum plus interest and costs and interest on the late payment of USD 200,000. Award accordingly. Issued 27 March 2017 This website removes the names of the parties involved in this or other awards. The reader can find more details on Jus Mundi https://jusmundi.com/en/ . These awards mostly come into the public domain through enforcement under the NYC 1958 .

I am pleased to present the third guidebook published for free as part of a series of “Snapshot Guides” on charter disputes that I write. Given my daily involvement with charter disputes and the parties’ extensive reference to LMAA Awards during settlement negotiations, I started in 2015 to prepare for convenience a list of the summaries that I update annually with new decisions and a brief description or keywords for quick reference material. To prepare this list, the short observations and statistics, I read all the published summaries from 1979, refreshing my knowledge and learning more as few summaries went unnoticed or involved uncommon issues. After publishing the guidebook “Snapshot Guide to Laytime & Demurrage”, I aimed to publish another guidebook with more categories of charter disputes, i.e. “A Snapshot Guide to Charterparties”. However, the published awards considered disputes under several types of contracts. Therefore I decided to prepare and share this “Snapshot Guide to LMAA Awards” as a list, with awards in chronological order. But, of necessity, I could not include more information about the summaries apart from some keywords, statistics and brief observations. Therefore, the keywords had to be extremely short, and some aspects were not covered. Notably, as a conscientious reader of the Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter https://www.lmln.com/ , it would not be right for me to lose this opportunity to pay tribute to Michael Daiches, who edited the LMLN and prepared award summaries for 40 years, from 1981-2021. This guidebook includes statistics and brief observations. As observed, approximately 20-25% of the cases referred to arbitration proceed to an award. Regarding the rest, the parties usually settle the case during the various stages of the reference. Most of the published awards considered disputes that arose under charter parties or bills of lading contracts, and fewer considered disputes under contracts for ship sales, shipbuilding and repair. Roughly 70% of the disputes that came before arbitrators involved issues of construction or interpretation: by way of remarks, some tribunals commented on the relatively relaxed draftsmanship adopted over the years when it came to construing the contract. For the reader’s easy reference, the chart below shows that commonly disputed issues fall into these categories: laytime and demurrage, hire payment, off-hire, cargo claims, arbitration practice, freight and dead freight, speed and performance, and maintenance (mostly the holds condition and cranes) or unseaworthiness, e.g. mainly due to engine damages or other matters, e.g. cracks in the hull or side shell plating, tail shaft damaged, or for crew matters, including consideration of the Hague Rules defences, competing causes of delay- chain of causation, etc. And fewer issues about disbursements, unsafe ports (hull & mooring ropes damaged, actions of pilots and tugs), bunkers, extra insurance, and sales of ship or shipbuilding contracts LMAA Published Awards 1979 – 2022 Note: this book may be freely distributed online and in print, provided it is in complete form without any amendments and contains all credits as referred to in the guidebook (see copyrights section). Credit to Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter https://www.lmln.com/ and I-law https://www.i-law.com/ilaw/index.htm

The vessel was chartered on an amended NYPE 1946 form for a trip to Hodeidah- an area exposed to war risks. A dispute arose concerning the amount of the extra war risk insurance premium payable by the charterers. Consequently, the parties referred the dispute to arbitration in London. The owners presented the invoices from their London brokers that calculated the extra premium as 1.5% of the vessel’s value less a 35% discount. The owners said this amount was paid and did not exceed what Lloyd’s of London Underwriters quoted. In addition, the owners referred to another fixture with the charterers concerning another vessel for which the charterers had paid a similar amount. Thus, the owners said that the charterers knew the premiums to pay for this fixture. The charterers’ case was that the calculation based on 1.5% of the vessel’s insured value was not representative of the vessel’s time in port and was excessive. The owners should have presented a quote (based on the wording “as quoted”) before entering this area, allowing the charterers to challenge the sum quoted by the owners’ insurers. The charterers denied any reliance on the other fixture caused a waiver or acceptance. Lastly, the charterers applied 0.5% less 35% discount and paid that sum to the owners. That was based on the charterer’s brokers’ enquiries for other Yemeni calls. Held, The owners have failed to submit documentation or quotations before entering the war zone. If the owners could not comply with the requirements of the clause because they could only offer the documents after the event, the relevant clause required necessary amendments. However, the owner’s failure to follow this process was not enough for the charterers to avoid payment of EWRI. But, importantly, the extra insurance payment should be a London Market rate or a rate not exceeding what was quoted by the London Market at the time. On the evidence, the rate obtained was at the high end of the range, but it fell within the charter party provisions. Therefore, the charterers had to pay the amount claimed by the owners. Award accordingly. For a similar issue, see London Arbitration 9/02 . Note: no other information can be provided for this award. The website removes the names of the parties involved in any award.

After the vessel’s redelivery, the owners claimed unpaid hire. The charterers denied liability and made a counterclaim concerning the vessel’s underperformance. Consequently, the dispute was referred to arbitration in London and determined by a sole arbitrator. The charterers relied on various reports issued by their weather routing company (WRC) to support their claim. Two main issues arose: the meaning of “no swell” in the performance clause and which evidence of the weather conditions to be used to assess the vessel’s performance. As a starting point, the arbitrator had to determine- as a matter of construction- the owners’ warranty in respect of the vessel’s speed and consumption, including the weather conditions in which to assess the vessel’s performance. These were dealt with by reading together the vessel’s description clause and the weather routing clause. The arbitrator held that evidence of the weather conditions had to be taken from the vessel’s logs, as stated in the clause. If the charterers wished their WRC’s data to be used for the analysis, this should have been made clear in the clause. Relying on the deck logs or the HYCOM (used by the WRC), both identified the same good weather periods that the owners challenged due to swell (but the owners made no comments about the adverse currents). Concerning the words “no swell”, the arbitrator adopted a pragmatic view to give meaning to these words and held that the parties must have intended them to mean that periods with adverse swell should be excluded from the assessment. The WRC adopted a methodology that limited the significant wave height to 1.25 meters under the wording “Douglas Sea state and no swell”. The WRC expressed the view that, typically, swell waves in excess of 2 meters would have any noticeable adverse effect upon a handysize vessel. Regarding the evidence, the WRC said that their report relied on the deck logs and their own analysis of the weather conditions. The arbitrator held that the charterers bear the burden of proving the owners have breached the performance clause. That required careful consideration of the performance report that charterers relied upon to support their claim. The tribunal had difficulty in accepting the WRC’s conclusions because the swell analysis was not an exact science. Also, the noon reports recorded strong adverse currents in the good weather periods, when the reported swell was similar to that analysed in the report. Lastly, the arbitrator felt uncomfortable with the evidence because the WRC used the deck logs and their analysis of the conditions encountered, contrary to the charter party terms. Therefore, the charterers had failed to discharge their burden of proving that the vessel breached the performance warranties. Accordingly, the charterers’ counterclaim failed, and costs followed the event under the normal rule. Note: no further information can be provided for this award. This website removes the names of the parties involved in any award.

The vessel was chartered on an amended NYPE form for a voyage from a port in Thailand to a port in China. One of the disputes concerned the charterers’ deduction from hire due to the masters’ decision not to follow the shorter and direct route recommenced by their appointed weather routing company, resulting in extra time loss on the voyage. Consequently, the dispute was referred to arbitration in London. The owners’ case was that the masters’ decision to move further offshore in one part of the voyage was due to safety reasons, given the presence of fishing vessels in the area. Additionally, in another part of the voyage, the master decided to alter course to avoid the effect of heavy rolling and pitching. The charterers’ case was that the owners had failed to comply with clause 8 of the charter party that required the vessel to proceed with utmost despatch to her destination. Further, the charterers rejected the owners’ submission that the charterers consented to this decision because they made no complaint when the master reported the course change to the weather routing company. In terms of evidence, the owners have offered nothing to support the masters’ decision for safe navigation- as alleged. The tribunal dismissed the charterers’ claim and felt reluctant to challenge the masters’ navigational decisions in the absence of any evidence produced by the charterers to support that no reasonable master would make this decision. The tribunal expressed the view that a witness statement from the master with reasons to justify his decision would assist. Still, even without the same, this did not affect the owners’ case because of the sufficient information supporting his decision. In a similar settled case, the parties’ arguments centred on the Hill Harmony case and tried to distinguish it since the facts of that case were too extreme and did not bear a striking resemblance to the present case. Charterers contended that the proposed route was not unsafe; the presence of fishing vessels did not render a route unsafe, as this was a standard route for ships of a similar size that navigated successfully without similar safety issues arising. In another arbitration award, a similar view expressed that a risk of collision did not mean that fishing vessels really imposed a threat to merchant shipping. All required was for the crew to exercise vigilance when navigating the area. Note: no additional information can be provided for this Award. This website removes the names of the parties involved or referred to the Award.

Owners sought a Partial Final Award for outstanding demurrage of $694,443.58 plus interest, fees and costs, under an ASBATANKVOY charter party for one voyage from Uruguay to Chile. The issue in this arbitration, under the SMA Rules, was whether the owner was entitled to a Partial Final Award for outstanding demurrage incurred during two periods 2 and 3, without first hearing evidence and determining whether the alleged unseaworthiness or fault of the vessel or owner caused or contributed to her collision with the supply vessel and resulting delays incurred during Period 1 at La Paloma. This was essentially a burden of proof dispute. As found, the owner carried its burden for its demurrage claims, whereas the charterer did not. The background The vessel tendered NOR on March 11, 2014, at 0130 at La Paloma, Uruguay, two days beyond her cancelling date, which the charterer accepted at 0642. She was to load in a ship-to-ship operation, but at about 0630, a supply vessel collided with her. Charterers reported this incident to the receivers, who stated that it is essential for the vessel to arrive and receive the cargo within the loading window to maintain their commercial commitments. The vessel underwent permanent repairs at a local shipyard and re-tendered NOR on March 21 at 0230, which the charterers accepted. On the same date, the receivers wrote to charterers that the cargo would arrive considerably late and the vessel’s arrival at the discharge port would be treated as outside the delivery window. Upon completion of loading on March 26 at 0654, the Master protested for delays between March 21 at 0230 and the commencement of loading due to the low average rate of 5,373.23 compared to the vessel’s maximum requested loading rate which was up to 9,480 cubic meters per hour. On April 5 at 1510, the vessel arrived at Quintera and tendered NOR, which was not accepted until May 3 at 1255. The Master protested and noted that only two hoses of 10 inches bore were connected while the vessel’s manifolds were 3 x 16 inches and the maximum requested pressure 6 kgr/cm2 at the ship’s rail. Discharging began on May 3, 1606 and was completed on May 4, 1930 hours. The parties’ contentions Owners The owners’ demurrage claims related to three periods: Period 1 —From March 11, 2014, at 0130 that NOR tendered until NOR re-tendered on March 21 at 0230. Period 2 — From March 21 at 0230 until completion of loading on March 26 at 0654. Period 3 — From arrival and tendering NOR at Quintera, Chile on April 5 at 1510 until completion of discharging on May 4, 2014, at 1918. Owners dispute that the collision with the supply vessel was due to unseaworthiness or the masters’ negligence or fault. Given that the charterer would dispute the first period, the owners sought a partial final award only for periods 2 and 3, which were said to be unrelated and unaffected by any delays due to the collision. Further, the charterer utterly unexplained period 2 delay at La Paloma. Concerning the delays during period 3, from April 5 due to “documentation issues of cargo receivers”, these were resolved on April 16, and the vessel moved to the anchorage. However, delays occurred from April 14 while awaiting the arrival of the other STS Vessel until she arrived at Quintera on April 30. The owners’ case was that the charterers, receivers, or agents provided no evidence to explain these delays, and the charterers failed to carry their burden of proof with respect to explaining the delays during periods 2 and 3. Therefore, it is appropriate to have a Partial Final Award in its favour. Charterers Charterers contend that owners’ request for a Partial Final Award should be denied because the demurrage claims for periods 2 and 3 are related to facts and issues arising from the collision. First, the collision delays prevented the vessel from loading during the loading window, and the owners’ claims were premature and not ripe for determination. Second, the collision was caused by the vessel’s unseaworthiness and/or the Master’s negligence resulting in delays at loading and discharging ports. Third, the collision was the proximate cause of the vessel missing her delivery window at Quintera, resulting in delays beyond the charterers’ control. Lastly, the owners’ demurrage calculations were inaccurate, and the owners’ claim for attorney’s fees should be denied as the SMA Rules are inapplicable to this proceeding. Discussion and decision The law is well-established concerning the issues of an owner’s obligation to present its vessel within her laycan, a charterer’s reciprocal right to cancel should the vessel be presented beyond her laycan, and the parties’ respective burdens of proof in demurrage disputes. The owner was obligated to proceed to the loading port with all “convenient dispatch”, and if the vessel was not ready to load on the cancelling date, the charterer had the option of either cancelling by giving timely and unequivocal notice or accepting the vessel. Without an effective notice of cancellation, the Charter remained in effect. The charterer may also have a right to damages if the owner breached its obligations to proceed with dispatch or, in relatively rare cases, its conduct was unreasonable and/or deceptive. The owner has the initial burden of proving its prima facie claim for demurrage by establishing through notices of readiness, port logs, vessel logs and laytime calculations that time consumed in loading and discharging the cargo exceeded the agreed laytime. The charterer is liable to pay demurrage for excess laydays except 1) where a specific provision of a charter party exonerates the charterer from liability; 2) where the delay is the fault of the owner or those for whom it is responsible; and 3) where the delay is caused by vis major . The owners and charterers were experienced and sophisticated players, and a “time is of the essence” provision for the loading/discharging windows at La Paloma and Quintera could have been easily inserted into their Charter. However, it was not, and it was undisputed that this “timeliness” was never brought to the owner’s attention and remained strictly between the charterer and its receiver. The only “timeliness” provision in the Charter was the laycan dates of March 8-9. The vessel was presented at La Paloma beyond these dates on March 11 (two days into the loading window discussed only between charterer and receiver) and was unconditionally accepted. The charterer could have exercised its cancellation rights under Clause 5 of the Charter, but freely chose not to do so and thereby waived its rights in this respect. The charterer had not explained that the collision on March 11 proximately caused all delays or rebutted the owners’ submissions. Accordingly, the majority awarded the owners their demurrage claims of $694,443.58 plus interest $13,839.96. In addition, the owners were entitled to a reasonable allowance for attorney’s fees and costs based on Clause 24, which would be addressed in the Final Award. Partial Final Award, 27 March 2015. This website removes the names of the parties involved in this or other awards. The reader can find more details on Jus Mundi https://jusmundi.com/en/ . These awards mostly come into the public domain through enforcement under the NYC 1958 .

In this consolidated arbitration, demurrage disputes arose under six charter parties, evidenced by a fixture recap incorporating amended versions of the ASBATANKVOY form with additional charterers’ clauses. Each vessel was chartered for the carriage of fuel oil from Fujairah to Karachi and other discharge ports. Charterers denied liability and counterclaimed of US$212,520.16 in respect of cargo shortage under five bills of lading issued in three of the charter parties. The matter came before two Arbitrators that accepted appointment under the LMAA Terms 2006 and dealt with all issues in a single Final Arbitration Award, following the request of the different owning companies in this arbitration. The parties’ contentions Charterers’ primary case was that delays had occurred in getting the vessel to the berth over which they had no control, and therefore laytime should not start until the vessel was all fast at the load port. If these periods of delay were excluded (clause 6 of the ASBATANKVOY), there was no demurrage due. The charterers alleged these delays: tidal restrictions in four charter parties, delay in obtaining free pratique in one charter party, and no reason of the cause of the delay was offered in one charter party. In the owners’ case, insofar as the vessels could not berth on arrival, there was a prima facie breach of the charterers’ obligation under clause 9 that the berth should be “reachable on arrival”. Then, it was for the charterers to demonstrate that the berth was reachable on arrival and that it became unreachable due to a supervening delay beyond their control, for which no evidence was adduced. Therefore, the charterers could not rely on clause 6 of the ASBATANKVOY since it does not apply unless the charterers procure a berth “reachable on arrival”( The Laura Prima [1982] 1 LI. Rep. 1 ), and so should the demurrage exceptions in clause 8. Owners provided evidence that the cause of delay was congestion. Owners’ alternative case was that the additional charterers’ clauses 12 and 14 provided a complete code and overrode the provisions in the ASBATANKVOY. In defending the charterers’ counterclaim, the owners pointed out that the short shipments were governed by clause 15 of the charterers’ incorporated clauses, which dealt with in Transit Loss and Cargo Retention. Therefore, there was no claim. Held, Clauses 12 and 14 did not override but were complementary to the provisions of the ASBATANKVOY form. The charterers’ primary obligations were to comply with clauses 6 and 9. On the evidence, the actual cause of delay was congestion, and charterers were in breach of clause 9 for either of the grounds alleged to cause delay. Since clause 15 was amended in the fixture recap of the three relevant charter parties, it nullified all but 1.5% of the charterers’ counterclaim. Owners conceded the 1.5%, and the tribunal awarded US$3,188.55. Accordingly, the owners were awarded the demurrage claimed in each of the six charter parties, together with interest and costs. Charterers were also awarded US$3,188.5, plus interest. Interest Owners were entitled to interest of 5%per annum and pro rata compounded at 3-monthly rests to run in each case from 14 days after the demurrage claims were first presented to the charterers. Similarly, the same rate was applied for the charterers’ counterclaim but used for simplicity to the entire sum from 14 days after the presentation of the first cargo claim. Costs Under the normal rule, costs follow the event. Charterers should bear the owners’ recoverable costs together with the costs of the Award. As a single Award was made for all claims, the tribunal expected the owners to allocate the costs of each claim among themselves. If not, the tribunal would say that costs should be equally divided between the six references. Final Award, 19 September 2011 This website removes the names of the parties involved in this or other awards. The reader can find more details on Jus Mundi https://jusmundi.com/en/ . These awards mostly come into the public domain through enforcement under the NYC 1958 .